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THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE CENTRO 
PROPERTIES GROUP EARNINGS REVISION AND 
REFINANCING ANNOUNCEMENTS: AN EVENT STUDY 
 
WILLIAM DIMOVSKI 
Deakin University 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyses the impact of the global financial crisis using Centro Properties 
Group’s earnings revision and refinancing announcements on December 17th 2007 as the 
event date to investigate the change in risk profile for A-REITs that were included in the 
S&P/ASX 300. The study finds that nine of the 25 A-REIT constituents on the S&P/ASX 
300 recorded statistically significant negative abnormal returns on 17th December 2007 
and that the systematic risk for many A-REITs moved significantly higher after this date. 
This increased systematic risk has major implications for the cost of capital to the sector. 
 
Keywords: A-REITs, global financial crisis, CAPM. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Assets owned by Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs, but formerly known 
as listed property trusts or LPTs) have grown substantially up to November 2007. Newell 
(2005) reports that these A-REITs had a compound average annual return of over 11.6% 
with a standard deviation of 8.2% compared to stocks which had a compound average 
annual return of around 9.1% and a standard deviation of 8.7% from June 1994 to June 
2004. It appears that the capital market appreciated this high return and low risk feature 
that A-REITs grew in market capitalisation from around $10 billion in the mid-1990s to 
over $80 billion in the mid-2000s and Australian REITs held over 16% of the global REIT 
value (KPMG, 2007). Only a few years earlier, Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2005) note that 
the A-REIT sector in 2004 accounted for around 10% of the global REIT value.  
 
The strong performance of A-REITs is well documented in the academic literature. 
Newell and Peng (2006) report on the significance of the emerging property sectors such 
as self-storage, health care, retirement facilities and leisure/entertainment in investment 
portfolios. They find superior risk adjusted performance by these sectors as well as 
portfolio diversification benefits during 2002 to 2005. Newell (2007) assesses the 
performance of industrial properties and notes that industrial A-REITs provided consistent 
and well-performed risk-adjusted returns during 1995 to 2006. Peng and Newell (2007) 
and later Newell and Peng (2008) also find that infrastructure funds performed strongly 
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during 1995 to 2006 and provided useful diversification benefits. Since many A-REITs 
hold significant levels of international property in their portfolios, Newell and MacIntosh  
(2007) identify the variety of risk management strategies adopted by the A-REITs in 
managing their capital and income. The A-REIT sector was generally viewed as well 
managed, owning large, conservative, highly rated investment grade properties which 
were considered to have reliable and stable tenants and sound cash flows. The sector was 
a favourite amongst investors. Newell (2008) explains the sector’s importance to 
superannuation funds. 
 
Amongst the recent professional literature, KPMG (2008) suggest the US sub-prime 
mortgage crisis turned into a global financial crisis and values in investment sectors that 
were considered “over leveraged” were punished. They report that on June 30th 2008, the 
value of the A-REIT sector was 41% down on its July 1st 2007 value. This was compared 
to a fall of 19% for the S&P/ASX200. BDO Kendall (2008), a large accounting and 
business advisory firm and experts in A-REITs, also reported that by June 30th 2008 the 
A-REIT sector fell 43% from its peak 8 months earlier. BDO Kendall (2009a) go on to 
report that only one of 61 A-REITs they surveyed earned a positive return to December 
31st 2008; 14 trusts suspended distributions; that for the first time since 2002, A-REITs 
were priced below their net tangible assets (NTA) and that nine out of 10 entities recorded 
falls in the values of their properties. More recently, BDO Kendall (2009b) confirm that 
the S&P/ASX300 accumulation index lost 29% for the 12 months to 30th April 2009 while 
the S&P/ASX300 A-REIT accumulation index lost 57%. A-REITs during the period 
December 2007 to the first third of 2009 have clearly underperformed. 
 
BDO Kendall (2008) suggest that the A-REIT sector started to be less attractive to 
investors in December 2007 and coincided with Centro Properties Group announcements 
to the ASX in that month. In brief, on December 17th 2007, Centro Properties Group 
issued an announcement to the ASX essentially advising of three matters. Firstly, they 
advised that there would be increased costs associated with debt facilities and that capital 
expenditure restrictions imposed by the financiers would restrict growth in earnings in the 
United States. Secondly, that Centro managed A$26.6 billion of property assets, was 
performing in line with expectations and that they were continuing to negotiate the 
refinancing of A$1.3 billion (with the loan extended to 15th February 2008). Thirdly, 
Centro suggested that to be prudent in terms of financing options that they would not pay 
a distribution for the second half of the year ended 31st December 2007. The market did 
not take kindly to this announcement and Centro Properties share price was slashed from a 
closing price of over $6 the day before the announcement to a closing price of $1.36 on 
the day of the announcement. The smaller Centro Retail Trust which was about one fifth 
the size of Centro Properties issued a similar announcement suggesting they were 
performing strongly and that they were continuing to negotiate the refinancing of A$1.2 
billion (with the loan extended to 15th February 2008) and that to be prudent in terms of 
financing options that they would also not pay a distribution for the second half of the 
year ended 31st December 2007. The price of Centro Retail Trust shares was also slashed 
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from $1.42 the day before the announcement to a closing price of $0.85 on the day of the 
announcement. 
 
The DatAnalysis database reports that Centro Properties was established in June 1997 as 
the Prime Retail Group (a stapled entity consisting of a unit trust and a property 
management company). At the time, it had a market capitalisation of around A$106 
million. Large scale acquisitions funded by debt and equity allowed the entity to grow 
dramatically. Centro Retail Trust was floated in August 2005 to be a pure retail property 
ownership trust. Centro Retail Trust and Centro Properties were managed by Centro 
Properties, which by January 2006 had assets under management of around A$10 billion. 
Two major US REIT acquisitions (along with smaller acquisitions) during 2006 and 2007 
(Heritage and New Plan) allowed Centro Properties to control over A$26 billion in 
property assets by December 2007. Centro Properties was at the time the second largest 
A-REIT behind Westfield Group, with Westfield being the largest REIT in the world (and 
around twice the size of the much older and established Stockland and GPT). While 
Centro may have fully expected debt funding to be continually available, the US sub 
prime crisis and the global financial crisis were soon to unfold. 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of the global financial crisis using 
Centro’s earnings revision and refinancing announcements as the event date to investigate 
the change in risk profile for Centro Properties, Centro Retail Trust and the other A-
REITs that were included in the S&P/ASX 300. The study finds that the systematic risk 
for many A-REITs moved significantly higher after these announcements and it suggests 
that this increase in systematic risk has major implications for the cost of capital to the 
sector. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, key capital asset 
pricing model and event study concepts are discussed. Section 3 outlines the data and the 
models. The results are discussed in section 4. The last section makes some concluding 
comments and discusses some implications for A-REITs. 
 
THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL AND EVENT STUDY 
CONCEPTS 
 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) was introduced to the finance community in the 
1960s by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). The model builds on the work 
of Markowitz (1952). The CAPM suggests that an asset's risk is made up of systematic 
and unsystematic risk components. Systematic risk reflects how each individual asset has 
moved against the market. Unsystematic risk is risk that is peculiar or specific to the 
individual asset. Elton and Gruber (1977) point out clearly how the average standard 
deviation of returns for a portfolio of stocks can be reduced substantially by having more 
stocks in the portfolio. As such, investors will only be rewarded for systematic risk (beta 
value) because unsystematic risk can be diversified away.  
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In this study of the 25 A-REIT constituents of the S&P/ASX 300, and using 150 days of 
returns prior to December 17, 2007, only Centro Properties Group and Valad Property 
Group showed betas of more than one. Most of the others had betas substantially less than 
one (Astro Japan Property Trust is excluded from the analysis because it joined the list on 
27 July 2007 and hence insufficient data was available). 
 
A common CAPM use is to calculate a firm’s cost of equity (which is also the required 
rate of return by shareholders) and then can be used to value the firm. Large increases in 
required rates of return by shareholders mean large increases in the cost of equity to the 
firm, therefore decreases in the value of the firm. A second use is in event studies to work 
out “abnormal” returns at or after an event day (or days). Abnormal returns are the actual 
returns less the normal or expected return (MacKinlay, 1997). The following general 
market model is used to calculate normal or expected returns: 
 
     
    (1) 
 
where:  
 E(Ri,t) = The expected return on security i on day t; 
 αi = The intercept term; 
 βi = The slope or beta coefficient; 
 Rm,t = The actual return for the market index, in this study, the ASX All  
                         Ordinaries Index; and 
 εi,t = The standard error, 
 
 
and the abnormal return is: 
  
     (2) 
 
where:  
 Ri,t = The actual return on security i on day t; 
 E(Ri,t) = The expected return on security i on day t; 
 ARi,t = The abnormal return being the difference between the actual return  
                            and expected returns above. 
   
Event study methodology has been well used in the property literature to determine 
whether a particular event in the capital market or in a company or industry sector affects 
an entity’s share price performance. Some event studies are simply concerned with 
abnormal returns on a particular day (like this one), but many studies sum abnormal 
returns to calculate a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) which tries to measure the total 
impact of an event through a time period (or event window). Some recent property 
literature that use event study methodology include: 
ARi,t = Ri,t − E (Ri,t )
titmiiti RRE ,,, )()( εβα ++=
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• The wealth effects of REIT acquisitions (Allen and Sirmans, 1987; Campbell et al, 
2001) 
 
• The wealth effects of real estate acquisitions and disposals (Glascock et al. 1989; 
Ting et al, 2006). 
 
DATA AND MODELS 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the Centro announcements on the 
market model for Centro Properties and Centro Retail Trust and investigate whether 
abnormal returns occurred on 17 December 2007. The study also investigates whether 
there has been a statistically significant change in the systematic risk for the two Centro 
entities after this announcement or event day.  
 
After investigating ASX announcements from all the other listed property trust 
constituents of the S&P/ASX 300 at the time, and finding no particularly unusual or 
controversial announcements from any of them, this study further investigates whether 
any abnormal returns were incurred by any of the other A-REITs on the 17th December, 
the Centro announcements or events day. The study follows on with an investigation 
whether there has been a statistically significant change in the systematic risk for the other 
23 A-REITs after 17th December. Daily share price data for 150 days before the event day, 
on the event day and 150 days after the event day for each of the 25 A-REIT constituents 
on the S&P/ASX 300 and All Ordinaries Index data has been sourced from FinAnalysis. 
The pricing data was subsequently converted into return data and the market model 
estimated for all 25 A-REITs. 
 
The estimated model is: 
 
A-REITi,=  β0 + β1RMKT+  β2EVENTDAY + β3AFTEREDAY + 
β4AFTEREDAY*RMKT +  ε                                                                                   (3) 
 
 
where: 
• A-REITi, is the A-REIT under investigation   
• RMKT is the return on the market (All Ordinaries Index) 
• EVENTDAY is the event dummy variable which contains a 1 on December 17th and 
zeros the days before and after this event day 
• AFTEREDAY is an additive dummy and contains zeros up to December 17th and ones 
the days after this event day 
 
• AFTEREDAY*RMKT is a multiplicative dummy measuring the return on the market 
after the event day 
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and the β’s are unknown parameters to be estimated and ε is assumed ~ N (0, σ²). 
 
A-REIT RESULTS 
 
Table 1 reports results for the mean daily returns and the standard deviation of those daily 
returns for each of the 25 A-REITs. The first column identifies the A-REIT. The second 
column identifies the mean daily returns and the standard deviation of daily returns for 
each of the 25 A-REITs for the 301 day period of the study. The mean daily returns for all 
but Commonwealth Property Office (CPA) over the period were negative (CPA was 
however zero). The third column identifies the mean daily returns and the standard 
deviation of daily returns for each of the 25 A-REITs for the 150 days prior to the event 
day and shows a mixture of positive, zero and negative mean daily returns. The standard 
deviation of daily returns is substantially lower than that of the whole 301 day sample. 
The last column identifies the mean daily returns and the standard deviation of daily 
returns for each of the 25 A-REITs for the 150 days after the event day and shows only 
negative mean daily returns. The standard deviation of daily returns is substantially higher 
than that of the whole 301 day sample and certainly higher than for the 150 day period 
prior to the event day.  
 
Table 1: The impact of the GFC on the mean daily returns and standard deviations  
               of A-REITs before and after the Centro announcements  
 
A-REIT Overall 301 day mean 
daily return/standard 
deviation 
Mean daily return and 
std dev 150 days prior 
to 17/12/2007 
Mean daily return and 
std dev 150 days after 
17/12/2007 
ABP Abacus -0.002 
0.022 
 
-0.001 
0.015 
-0.003 
0.028 
AEZ APN European 
Retail 
-0.005 
0.051 
 
-0.001 
0.016 
-0.010 
0.070 
APZ Aspen -0.002 
0.030 
 
0.001 
0.022 
-0.001 
0.035 
BWP Bunnings 
Warehouse 
-0.001 
0.022 
 
0.000 
0.019 
-0.001 
0.023 
CNP Centro Properties -0.012 
0.150 
 
-0.003 
0.022 
-0.011 
0.172 
CER Centro Retail -0.006 
0.125 
 
-0.001 
0.022 
-0.007 
0.169 
CFX CFS Retail -0.001 
0.018 
 
0.000 
0.015 
-0.001 
0.021 
CDI Challenger 
Diversified 
-0.002 
0.032 
0.000 
0.016 
-0.004 
0.043 
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CHC Charter Hall -0.004 
0.039 
 
-0.001 
0.004 
-0.006 
0.049 
CPA Commonwealth 
Property Office 
0.000 
0.022 
 
0.001 
0.015 
-0.001 
0.027 
DXS Dexus -0.001 
0.027 
 
0.001 
0.020 
-0.002 
0.032 
GMG Goodman -0.003 
0.033 
 
-0.002 
0.018 
-0.003 
0.037 
GPT GPT Group -0.004 
0.028 
 
-0.001 
0.007 
-0.006 
0.036 
IIF ING Industrial -0.002 
0.024 
 
0.000 
0.017 
-0.001 
0.029 
IOF ING Office -0.001 
0.027 
 
0.000 
0.016 
-0.001 
0.034 
ILF ING Real Estate 
Community Living 
-0.004 
0.026 
 
0.000 
0.010 
-0.001 
0.034 
MCW Macquarie 
Countrywide 
-0.003 
0.028 
 
-0.001 
0.015 
-0.005 
0.036 
MDT Macquarie DDR -0.005 
0.038 
 
-0.001 
0.016 
-0.008 
0.050 
MLE Macquarie 
Leisure 
-0.002 
0.029 
 
0.000 
0.020 
-0.004 
0.035 
MOF Macquarie Office -0.002 
0.029 
 
-0.001 
0.016 
-0.003 
0.037 
MGR Mirvac -0.003 
0.026 
 
0.001 
0.017 
-0.006 
0.033 
SGP Stockland -0.002 
0.025 
 
0.000 
0.015 
-0.004 
0.032 
TSO Tishman Speyer -0.002 
0.027 
 
-0.003 
0.019 
-0.002 
0.032 
VPG Valad -0.005 
0.043 
 
-0.003 
0.020 
-0.005 
0.056 
WDC Westfield -0.001 
0.024 
0.000 
0.023 
-0.001 
0.026 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the post event day mean daily returns diagrammatically. Average daily 
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losses incurred by investors in this sector were about 4/10ths of 1%, but investors in 
Centro Properties and APN European Retail incurred average daily losses of about 1%. 
Clearly, the post event day period was substantially worse in terms of returns to investors 
and substantially more volatile to such investors. While the standard deviation of daily 
returns to investors before the event day was around 1%, it was around 3-4% after the 
event day. 
 
Figure 1: The mean daily returns of A-REITs for 150 trading days after the Centro  
                 announcements  
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Table 2: The impact of the GFC on the systematic risk of A-REITs using the date of  
                the Centro announcements as the event day 
A-REIT  C RMKT EVENTDAY AFTEREDAY AFTEREDAY 
*RMKT 
ABP  Coeff. -0.001 
 
0.302 
** 
-0.029 
 
-0.001 
 
0.383 
** 
AEZ  Coeff. -0.001 
 
0.529 
 
-0.055 
 
-0.006 
 
0.984 
** 
APZ  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.761 
*** 
-0.032 
 
-0.003 
 
0.095 
 
BWP  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.733 
*** 
-0.015 
 
0.000 
 
0.086 
 
CNP  Coeff. -0.003 
 
1.116 
 
-0.741 
*** 
-0.005 
 
0.329 
 
CER  Coeff. -0.001 
 
0.592 
 
-0.380 
*** 
-0.004 
 
1.003 
 
CFX  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.697 
*** 
-0.014 
 
0.000 
 
-0.123 
 
CDI  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.380 
* 
0.054 
 
-0.003 
 
0.084 
 
CHC  Coeff. -0.001 
 
0.717 
*** 
-0.028 
 
-0.004 
 
0.344 
 
CPA  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.645 
*** 
-0.015 
 
0.000 
 
0.228 
 
DXS  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.932 
*** 
-0.033 
 
-0.001 
 
0.094 
 
GMG  Coeff. -0.002 
 
0.319 
*** 
-0.237 
 
0.000 
 
0.621 
*** 
GPT  Coeff. -0.001 
 
0.788 
*** 
-0.063 
** 
-0.003 
 
0.070 
 
IIF  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.679 
*** 
-0.053 
** 
-0.002 
 
0.096 
 
IOF  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.569 
*** 
-0.043 
* 
0.001 
 
0.637 
*** 
ILF  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.306 
* 
-0.020 
 
-0.006 
** 
0.346 
 
MCW  Coeff. -0.001 
 
0.761 
*** 
-0.036 
 
-0.002 
 
0.268 
 
MDT  Coeff. -0.002 
 
0.682 
*** 
-0.145 
*** 
-0.005 
 
0.002 
 
MLE  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.427 
* 
-0.017 
 
-0.004 
 
0.213 
 
MOF  Coeff. -0.001 
 
0.727 
*** 
-0.057 
** 
-0.001 
 
0.434 
** 
MGR  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.872 
*** 
-0.002 
 
-0.005 
* 
0.058 
 
SGP  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.699 
*** 
-0.018 
 
-0.002 
 
0.497 
*** 
TSO  Coeff. -0.003 
 
0.057 
 
-0.041 
 
0.002 
 
0.917 
*** 
VPG  Coeff. -0.003 
 
1.032 
*** 
-0.157 
*** 
-0.001 
 
0.108 
 
WDC  Coeff. 0.000 
 
0.821 
*** 
-0.031 
 
0.001 
 
0.301 
* 
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** = significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 2 reports the results of the regression model for Centro Properties and the other 24 
A-REITs under examination (R squared, adjusted R squared, F-statistic and Durbin-
Watson statistics are available from the author on request and are broadly acceptable). The 
results are interpreted as follows. The β1 coefficient reports the beta or slope coefficients 
for the A-REITs in the 150 days prior to the market. Other than Valad and Centro 
Properties, the betas for the other trusts were well under 1, with 15 of them under 0.7. The 
β2 EVENTDAY coefficient illustrates whether there was an abnormal return on 
December 17th 2007. The Centro Properties EVENTDAY coefficient had a significant 
negative return compared to the market as a whole of about 74% and Centro Retail Trust 
had a significant abnormal negative return of 38% compared to the market as a whole. 
While no other A-REITs made other than routine announcements on December 17th, 2007, 
GPT Group had a significant abnormal negative return of about 6%, ING Industrial Fund 
about 5%, ING Office Fund about 4%, Macquarie DDR Trust about 14%, Macquarie 
Office Trust about 6% and Valad about 16%. The β3 coefficient discloses the change in 
the intercept which reflects the risk free return in the market model. This research does not 
detect a change in this risk free rate of return in the 150 days following December 17th.  
 
The estimated model for Centro Properties is: 
 
CNP =  -0.003 + 1.116RMKT -  0.741EVENTDAY - .005AFTEREDAY + 
0.329AFTEREDAY*RMKT                                                          
 
Since EVENTDAY and AFTEREDAY are both zero in the model for the first 150 days, 
the estimated market model for Centro Properties for the period before December 17th 
2007 is reduced to: 
 
CNP =  -0.003 + 1.116RMKT 
 
And since AFTERDAY is recorded as 1 after the event day and EVENTDAY remains 
zero, the estimated market model for Centro Properties after the period December 17th 
2007 is: 
 
CNP =  -0.008 + 1.445RMKT 
 
The estimated model can be read in a similar way for all the other 24 A-REITs. The model 
shows an increase in the systematic risk after December 17th 2007 for all of the entities 
except for Colonial First State and ever so marginally for Macquarie DDR Trust. There is 
a statistically significant increase in the systematic risk for Abacus Property Group (from 
a beta of 0.302 to 0.685), APN European Retail Property Group (from a beta of 0.529 to 
1.513), Goodman Group (from a beta of 0.319 to 0.941), ING Office Fund (from a beta of 
0.569 to 1.206), Macquarie Office Trust (from a beta of 0.727 to 1.513), Stockland (from 
a beta of 0.699 to 1.196), Tishman Speyer Office Fund (from a beta of 0.057 to 0.974) and 
Westfield Group (from a beta of 0.821 to 1.122).  
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Figure 2 illustrates the post event day betas for the A-REITs. The average beta post event 
day tends towards 1 (it is actually 0.969 compared to the previous pre event day beta of 
0.646). 
 
Figure 2: The systematic risk of A-REITs after the date of the Centro  
                 announcements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR A-REITs 
 
The study finds that Centro Properties, Centro Retail Trust and seven of the other 23 A-
REIT constituents on the S&P/ASX 300 recorded statistically significant negative 
abnormal returns on 17th December 2007 and that the systematic risk for many A-REITs 
moved significantly higher after this date.  
 
It appears that the impact of the global financial crisis has been particularly severe on the  
A-REIT sector and the sector's reliance on debt, even though the borrowings were 
supported by relatively reliable and stable rental income, has caused this sector to be one 
of the hardest hit. It also appears that the systematic risk of many of the firms in the sector 
changed dramatically from being more conservative investments than the market on 
average, to becoming more risky investments than the market on average.  
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A serious implication for A-REITs is the increase in the cost of equity and hence it’s 
weighted average cost of capital. Because the weighted average cost of capital has 
increased, and equity values have fallen dramatically, A-REITs have tried to raise 
substantial new equity capital via private placements and rights issues at significant 
discounts over the last 20 months. Many A-REITs have also sold down property assets to 
shore up gearing positions. 
 
As for Centro Properties Group, they have sold a great deal of property, are still listed and 
appear to have weathered the global financial crisis, albeit at much reduced share prices. 
However, the directors as at late October 2009, are being sued by the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC) for incorrectly classifying short term debt as non-
current liabilities in the 2007 accounts. ASIC is also seeking management bans against the 
entire 2007 board for breach of duty by approving accounts containing material 
misstatements. 
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